Till Death Do Us Part or Otherwise Approved by the Court - Interpreting the Language of Sec. 510(C) of the IMDMA regarding Post-Death Maintenance Obligations and Life Insurance by King, Sarah Frances
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 60 
Issue 2 Winter 2011: Symposium - The Limits of 
Predictability and the Value of Uncertainty 
Article 18 
Till Death Do Us Part or Otherwise Approved by the Court - 
Interpreting the Language of Sec. 510(C) of the IMDMA regarding 
Post-Death Maintenance Obligations and Life Insurance 
Sarah Frances King 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Sarah F. King, Till Death Do Us Part or Otherwise Approved by the Court - Interpreting the Language of 
Sec. 510(C) of the IMDMA regarding Post-Death Maintenance Obligations and Life Insurance, 60 DePaul 
L. Rev. 713 (2011) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol60/iss2/18 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
TILL DEATH DO US PART OR OTHERWISE
APPROVED BY THE COURT? INTERPRETING THE
LANGUAGE OF § 510(C) OF THE IMDMA REGARDING
POST-DEATH MAINTENANCE OBLIGATIONS AND
LIFE INSURANCE
"I Bride, take you Groom, to be my husband, to have and to hold
from this day forward, for better or for worse, for richer or for
poorer . . . until death* do us part."
* In case of divorce, financial obligations may extend beyond death
as otherwise approved by the court. For further explanation see
IMDMA § 510(c).
-Legally Correct Wedding Vows
INTRODUCTION
As suggested above, the promises made at a traditional nuptial cer-
emony have fine print. To put it bluntly, based on the language of the
traditional vows, it would seem that the love and financial support
promised to a spouse during marriage terminates when death does the
bride and groom part; however, if that marriage ends in divorce, this is
not necessarily true. In Illinois, termination provisions for spousal
support following divorce are governed by § 510(c) of the Illinois
Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (IMDMA).' Like the
traditional wedding vows, this statute specifically lists death as an
event that terminates all future maintenance 2 obligations; however,
the statute goes on to say "[u]nless otherwise . . . approved by the
court."3 It is currently unsettled among the Illinois appellate districts
whether this language authorizes trial courts to order post-death
maintenance payments, namely by means of requiring one party to
1. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/510(c) (2008).
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties in a written agreement set forth in the judg-
ment or otherwise approved by the court, the obligation to pay future maintenance is
terminated upon the death of either party, or the remarriage of the party receiving
maintenance, or if the party receiving maintenance cohabits with another person on a
resident, continuing conjugal basis.
Id.
2. "Under the former Illinois Divorce Act, an award of spousal support, as distinguished from
child support, was known as alimony. Under the [IMDMA] it is known as maintenance." 2 H.
JosE-PH GrrIN, GrrIN ON DIVORCE: A GuiE 'o ILLINOIS MATRIMONHAiL LAw § 15-2 (3d ed.
2010) (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
3. 750 ILL. COMP. STAr. 5/510(c).
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maintain a life insurance policy listing the other as the sole benefici-
ary. Conflicting interpretations of the language of § 510(c) 4 raise sev-
eral important questions. First, what methods should Illinois courts
employ to most effectively interpret the language of the IMDMA
when determining whether the legislature authorized trial courts to
issue judgments contrary to statutory provisions? Second, under the
Act, is life insurance an allowable means of post-death maintenance?
Unless "agreed by the parties in a written separation agreement set
forth in the judgment or otherwise approved by the court," 5 § 510(c)
terminates future maintenance obligations upon the death of either
party or the remarriage or cohabitation of the payee. 6 Illinois courts
have generally considered a court order requiring a husband or wife to
continue to pay premiums on a policy for the benefit of their depen-
dent ex-spouse equal to a post-death maintenance obligation because
death triggers the benefits of a life insurance policy. Applying a num-
ber of disjointed and conflicting methods of statutory interpretation,
the Third and Fourth District Illinois Appellate Courts have come to
different conclusions about whether the language of § 510(c) autho-
rizes a court to order post-death maintenance in the form of life
insurance.
In a 2008 case, the third district held that a trial court erred as a
matter of law by requiring a payor to maintain an already existing life
insurance policy for the benefit of his ex-wife "so long as [he] was
statutorily obligated to pay maintenance." 7 In In re Marriage of Ellin-
ger, the court found that pursuant to § 510(c), a trial judge lacks the
discretion to order an ex-spouse to maintain a life insurance policy for
the benefit of his ex-wife absent a separate written agreement be-
tween the parties since § 510(c) explicitly terminated the obligation to
pay future maintenance on the death of either party." However, sev-
eral months later in In re Marriage of Walker, the fourth district ac-
cused the third district of applying a "faulty rationale," erroneously
relying on presumptive case law, and erring in its interpretation of
§ 510(c).9 In Walker, the court found that the language of § 510(c)
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. In re Marriage of Ellinger, 882 N.E.2d 692, 694 (111. App. Ct. 2008). The court remanded
the case because depriving the ex-wife of this life insurance policy "may have disturbed the trial
court's original equitable calculation." Id. The court noted that on remand the lower court
should "reconsider the distribution of those factors that may affect the financial future of the
parties." Id. at 696.
8. Id. at 695.
9. In re Marriage of Walker, 899 N.E.2d 1097, 1108 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
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was sufficiently broad to authorize a trial court to order the upkeep of
a life insurance policy as security for a maintenance obligation.' 0 The
fourth district concluded that, under the language of the section, a
trial court has the discretion to order various forms of security for
maintenance obligations that extend beyond death, including life
insurance."
The third and fourth district split necessitates taking a closer look at
the actual language of § 510(c). Consider the following hypothetical:
After thirty years of marriage, Jack and Jilll2 file for divorce due to
"irreconcilable differences"' 3 over who spilled the pail more often.
Jack and Jill are both fifty-five. Jack makes $300,000 a year as an engi-
neer. Jill makes $30,000 as a teacher. After three days of trial, the
court orders Jack to pay $3,000 per month to Jill as a permanent main-
tenance award in addition to a fifty-fifty property division. Jack and
Jill have no existing life insurance policies. Two days after their di-
vorce is finalized, Jack gets hit by a bus and dies. Assuming that Jack
and Jill did not execute any sort of separate written agreement requir-
ing Jack's estate to continue making $3,000 monthly maintenance pay-
ments to Jill after his death, in any district in Illinois, Jill is no longer
entitled to monthly maintenance once Jack dies.14 Knowing this,
could the hypothetical court have ordered Jack to take out a life insur-
ance policy naming Jill as the sole beneficiary? Put more broadly,
under § 510(c), does a court have the authority to extend Jack's finan-
cial obligations to Jill beyond his death to protect Jill's financial
future?
10. See id.
11. See id. Although the court did not give specific examples of other forms of maintenance
security beyond life insurance, it is common for maintenance payments to be secured during the
payor's life by the use of collateral trust, and after the payor's death, by the payor's estate. See
12 MULLER DAVIS & JODY MEYER YAZICI, ILLINOIS PRACIlCE SERIES: ILINOIS PRACICE OF
FAmnoY LAw 323 (10th ed. 2009). Further, under the old Divorce Act, § 21 spoke specifically of
the use of property liens to "secure the payment of any money to become due by installments."
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 40, para. 21 (1975).
12. Unfortunately, it is impossible for this Comment to discuss hypothetical situations for Jack
and Jack or Jill and Jill. Unlike the ambiguity over life insurance security, the IMDMA is very
clear in its exclusion of persons from the institution of marriage based on sexual orientation.
The Act states that "[a] marriage between 2 individuals of the same sex" is prohibited and is
"contrary to the public policy of this State." 750 ILL. COMP. S rAT. 5/212(a)(5), 5/213.1 (2008).
Hopefully, some day soon, Jack and Jack will be given their fair and equal opportunity to fight
over life insurance awards in their Illinois divorce decree.
13. 750 lIL. ComE. STAr. 5/401(a)(2). The IMDMA retains traditional fault grounds, but
adopts no-fault grounds as well, which require a showing that "irreconcilable differences have
caused the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage." Id.
14. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/510(c). "Unless otherwise agreed by the parties in a written
agreement set forth in the judgment or otherwise approved by the court, the obligation to pay
future maintenance is terminated upon the death of either party ..... Id.
2011] 715
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An interpretation of the plain meaning of the language of § 510(c)
reveals that the legislature intended to authorize trial courts to extend
maintenance obligations beyond death, remarriage, and cohabitation.
In addition, a more historical interpretation of the language reveals
that the IMDMA was adopted with an eye toward the Uniform Mar-
riage and Divorce Act,15 which specifically authorizes courts to order
post-death maintenance obligations.16
This Comment argues that based on a plain-meaning interpretation
of the language of § 510(c) and a whole-statute analysis, the Illinois
legislature intended to authorize trial courts to order a variety of post-
death maintenance provisions. Consequently, a trial court may pro-
tect the future financial needs of a dependent spouse through the use
of court-ordered life insurance.
In support of this thesis, Part II provides an overview of the goals of
spousal support under the IMDMA and the basic rationale behind
awards of life insurance security. It goes on to summarize the various
third and fourth district decisions addressing post-death maintenance
that led to the current split among the appellate districts.'7 Part III
analyzes the language of § 510(c) using plain-meaning interpretation
and whole-statute analysis.18 Part IV considers the potential impact of
post-death awards on individual parties and provides several examples
of the various tax consequences of court-ordered post-death
maintenance.' 9
II. BACKGROUND
Before interpreting the language of § 510(c) using plain-meaning
and whole-statute analysis, it is necessary to understand the impor-
tance of spousal support orders and review the court opinions that
created the current split in the districts. This Part first gives an over-
view of why maintenance awards may be necessary and why they are
often secured with life insurance. It concludes by discussing the con-
flicting interpretations of § 510(c) leading to the current split. In addi-
tion, this Part lays out the basic principles of statutory construction
applied in Part III to analyze the language of § 510(c).
15. See GrIN, supra note 2, § 1-1.
16. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DivoRCE; Acr § 307(b) Alternative A, 9A U.L.A. 288 (1998).
17. See infra notes 20-130 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 131-220 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 221-28 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 60:713716
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A. Statutory History of § 510(c)
On October 1, 1977, the current Illinois Marriage and Dissolution
of Marriage Act (IMDMA) became law, completely replacing the old
Divorce Act and broadly changing the practice of family law in Illi-
nois.2 0 The passage of the IMDMA also marked Illinois's adoption of
a modified version of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
(UMDA) promulgated in 1970 and amended in 1971 and 1973.21 Cur-
rently, eight states, including Illinois, have fully adopted the UMDA. 22
"Drafting of the [UMDA] by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws" (NCCUSL) began in 1967.23 A liai-
son with the American Bar Association (ABA) Section of Family Law
was established and all drafting sessions of the Act were conducted
jointly.24 However, the Act was not approved by the ABA house of
delegates until 1974.25 Controversy within the ABA over the UMDA
centered around the Act's recommendation for no-fault divorce.26
20. H. Joseph Gitlin, Practice and Procedures Under the New Divorce (Dissolution of Mar-
riage) Act, FAM. L. BuiL., Nov. 1987, at 1; see also Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage
Act, Pub. Act No. 80-923, § 510, 1977 Ill. Laws 2692.
21. Megan A. Drefchinski, Comment, Out with the Old and in with the New: An Analysis of
Illinois Maintenance Law Under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act and a Proposal for Its
Replacement, 23 N. ILL.. U. L. REV. 581, 585 (2002).
22. Mark R. Brown, Note, Whose Life (Insurance) Is It Anyway? Life Insurance and Divorce
in America, 22 J. FAM. L. 95, 126 n.203 (1983). Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Minne-
sota, Missouri, Montana, and Washington have adopted the UMDA. Id. Colorado has recog-
nized through judicial decision that § 316(b) of the Act changes the general rule that the
obligation to pay alimony ceases upon death. Id.; see also In re Marriage of Koktavy, 612 P.2d
1161, 1162 (Colo. App. 1980).
23. DESK GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORcE Acr 54 (rev. ed. 1982); see also
Developments in the Law-Marriage as Contract and Marriage as Partnership: The Future of
Antenuptial Agreement Law, 116 HARv. L. REV. 2075, 2089 (2003) (hereinafter Marriage as Con-
tract]. See generally Proceedings in Comm. of the Whole Report of the Special Comm. on Uni-
form Divorce and Marriage Laws of the Conference of Comm'rs on Uniform Law (Aug. 5, 1965).
24. DESK GuIDE TO THE UNIORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr, supra note 23, at 54.
25. See HANDBOOK OF THJE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM SrATE
LAwS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THlE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN I-s SEVENTY-SIXTH YLAR
55 (1967).
26. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/401(a)(2) (2008). In Illinois, traditional fault grounds for dis-
solution include impotency, the spouse had a living wife or husband at the time of the marriage,
adultery subsequent to marriage, willful desertion for one year or more, habitual drunkenness,
drug addiction, extreme physical or mental cruelty, felony conviction, or sexually transmitted
disease. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/401(a)(1). The no-fault grounds adopted under the Uniform Act
require a finding
[t]hat the spouses have lived separate and apart for a continuous period in excess of 2
years and irreconcilable differences have caused the irretrievable breakdown of the
marriage and the court determines that efforts at reconciliation have failed or that fu-
ture attempts at reconciliation would be impracticable and not in the best interests of
the family.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/401(a)(2). See also DAVIS & YAZICI, supra note 11, at 34. "The addition
of no-fault dissolution reflects the theory that the State's interest in preserving a marriage is no
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Since the ABA approved the 1974 version of the UMDA, all states,
including Illinois, have adopted some form of no-fault divorce. 27
The UMDA has had a profound impact on the development of di-
vorce law in the United States. First and foremost, the UMDA played
an integral role in abrogating fault-based divorce in the United States.
Furthermore, today, the commissioner's reports and comments to the
UMDA are an invaluable tool for interpreting state statutes derived
from the uniform model. For instance, § 510(c) of the Illinois Act
was derived from § 316(b) of the UMDA, which reads, "Unless other-
wise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree, the obliga-
tion to pay future maintenance is terminated upon the death of either
party .... ."28 According to the official comments, this subsection of
the Uniform Act "authorizes the parties to agree in writing or the
court to provide in the decree that maintenance will continue beyond
the death of the obligor"; however, in the absence of such a provision,
"this section sets the termination date for the obligation to pay future
maintenance." 29
Today, conflicting interpretations among the Illinois appellate dis-
tricts over the language of § 510(c) center around the phrase "Unless
otherwise agreed by the parties in a written separation agreement set
forth in the judgment or otherwise approved by the court." However,
as officially enacted on October 1, 1977, § 510(c) did not contain this
phrase.30 It was not until May 1981, when the Illinois Senate passed
Senate Bill 267 effectively amending then § 510(b), now § 510(c), that
parties were permitted to extend the obligation to pay future mainte-
nance beyond the death of either party or the remarriage or cohabita-
tion of the payee.31 The legislative amendment to the Act was a direct
response to the opinion of the First District Illinois Appellate Court in
In re Marriage of Bramson.32 Notwithstanding the clear intention of
the parties to the contrary, the court in Bramson interpreted the ter-
mination events enumerated in § 510(b) as mandatory events that
longer served when the parties do not share that interest." Id. (citing In re Marriage of Smoller,
578 N.E.2d 256 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)).
27. Marriage as Contract, supra note 23, at 2089.
28. UNIF. MARRIAGEz & DivoiRciE Acr § 316(b), 9A U.L.A. 102 (1998). An additional
ground for termination is "the remarriage of the party receiving maintenance." Id.
29. Id. § 316(b) cmt.
30. See Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, Pub. Act No. 80-923, § 510(b), 1977
Ill. Laws 2675.
31. See Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, Pub. Act No. 82-194, § 510(b), 1981
Ill. Laws 1130 (inserting "Unless otherwise agreed by the parties in a written separation agree-
ment set forth in the judgment or otherwise approved by the court . . . .").
32. In re Marriage of Bramson, 404 N.E.2d 469 (11. App. Ct. 1980); see also JosiEiH N. Du-
CANTO, TAX Asiicrs or DIssoLUTION AND SEPARATION, at 17-23 (1982).
[Vol. 60:713718
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could not be avoided.33 Upon the passing of Illinois Senate Bill 267,
Bramson was effectively overruled in this respect, essentially eliminat-
ing any dispute as to whether the language of the Act authorized par-
ties to extend future maintenance obligations beyond statutory
termination events.34 What remains unclear today is whether in addi-
tion to the parties, the amended language permits a court to extend
the obligation to pay maintenance beyond the payor's death.
In contrast to § 510(c) of the IMDMA and § 316(b) of the UMDA,
§ 510(d) concerning the termination of child support explicitly ex-
cludes death as a default statutory termination event: "Unless other-
wise provided in this Act, or as agreed in writing or expressly provided
in the judgment, provisions for the support of a child are terminated
by emancipation . . . but not by the death of a parent obligated to
support or educate the child."35 Unlike § 510(c), the statutory termi-
nation and non-termination provisions for child support that exist to-
day were also present at its enactment.36 However, the section was
substantially rewritten in 2003 to clarify emancipation termination.37
33. See Bramson, 404 N.E.2d at 471. The court in Bramson interpreted § 510(b) as follows:
The omission from the Illinois Act of the preamble clause contained in the Uniform
Act indicates that the terminating events contained in section 510(b) are mandatory.
Neither the parties pursuant to agreement nor the courts can avoid the statute's
directive.
Accordingly, the provision of the new Marriage Act applies regardless of the settle-
ment agreement.
Id. (citations omitted).
34. See 82nd Ill. Gen. Assem., Transcript of Senate Proceedings, May 19, 1981, at 278 (state-
ment of Sen. Marovitz).
This bill allows parties by, written agreement, to extend the obligation to pay future
maintenance beyond the death, remarriage, or conjugal cohabitation of one of the par-
ties. It is a product of the Chicago Bar Association and the Illinois State Bar Associa-
tion. The IRS looks to State laws as to . . . whether or not there's a taxable transfer.
And this would indicate that rather than have separate contracts, which is presently the
case, . . . the agreements could be put within a divorce decree and be enforceable.
Id.
35. 750 li-i. CoMr. SrA'r. 5/510(d) (2008). The Act further provides that in the event of an
obligor's death, the amount of expenses and/or support may be "enforced, modified, revoked or
commuted to a lump sum payment, as equity may require, and that determination may be pro-
vided for at the time of the dissolution of the marriage or thereafter." Id.
36. Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, Pub. Act No. 80-923, § 510(c), 1977 Ill.
Laws 2675.
37. See Unified Child Support Services Act, Pub. Act No. 92-0876, § 510(d), 2002 Ill. Laws
3348-49 (amending subsection (d)):
(d) Unless otherwise provided in this Act, or as agreed in writing or expressly provided in
the judgment, provisions for the support of a child are terminated by emancipation of the
child, or if the child has attained the age of 18 and is still attending high school, provi-
sions for the support of the child are terminated upon the date that the child graduates
from high school or the date the child attains the age of 19, whichever is earlier, but not
by the death of a parent obligated to support or educate the child. Unless otherwise
2011] 719
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Like § 510(c), § 510(d) regarding child support corresponds to a
UMDA provision. The corresponding UMDA provision, § 316(c),
provides that "provisions for the support of a child are terminated by
emancipation of the child but not by the death of a parent obligated to
support the child." 38 In addition to § 316(c), all other payment securi-
ties mentioned in the IMDMA and the UMDA reference only child
support. For example, § 503(g) of the IMDMA states, "The court if
necessary to protect and promote the best interests of the children
may set aside a portion of the jointly or separately held estates of the
parties in a separate fund or trust . . . . "39 This language corresponds
to § 307(b) of the UMDA. 40 The official commentary to § 307(b) of
the UMDA notes that the subsection "affords a way to safeguard the
interests of the children against the possibility of the waste or dissipa-
tion of the assets allotted to a particular parent in consideration of
being awarded custody or support of a child or children." 41
B. General Principles of IMDMA Maintenance Awards
Analyzing § 510(c) statutory termination events for maintenance
payments only makes sense in light of the rationale for ordering main-
tenance in the first place. Maintenance awards under the Act are con-
trolled by § 504(a)-(e). 42 In contrast, property awards are controlled
by § 503(a)-(j). 43 In many marriages, providing for a fully dependent
spouse by a division of property pursuant to § 503 will not provide
sufficient financial security.44 Thus, the current version of § 504 au-
agreed in writing or expressly provided in a judgment, provisions for the support of a
child are terminated by emancipation of the child, except as otherwise provided herein,
but not by the death of a parent obligated to support or educate the child. An existing
obligation to pay for support or educational expenses, or both, is not terminated by the
death of a parent. When a parent obligated to pay support or educational expenses, or
both, dies, the amount of support or educational expenses, or both, may be enforced,
modified, revoked or commuted to a lump sum payment, as equity may require, and
that determination may be provided for at the time of the dissolution of the marriage or
thereafter.
Id. (alteration in original).
38. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIvoRc- Acr § 316(c), 9A U.L.A. 102 (1998). This section contains
similar information concerning the "just and appropriate" payment of post-death child support.
Id.
39. 750 liai-. COMP. STAJ. 5/503(g).
40. UNIF. MARRIAGE7 & Divoicwi Acr § 307(b) Alternative A, 9A U.L.A. at 288.
41. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DivoRciE Acr § 307(b) Alternative A cmt., 9A U.L.A. at 289.
42. 750 I.L. COMP. STAT. 5/504(a)-(e).
43. 750 li.i. COMP. STrAT. 5/503(a)-().
44. See GIuN, supra note 2, § 15-1. "The curse of the poor is that they must pay in install-
ments." Id.
[Vol. 60:713720
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thorizes courts to award maintenance to either spouse on a need
basis. 45
The 1993 amendments to the IMDMA substantially rewrote § 504,
omitting the provision that a court may grant maintenance only if it
finds that the spouse seeking maintenance "lacks sufficient property,
including marital property apportioned to him, to provide for his rea-
sonable needs."46  Before the 1993 amendments, property awards
were the primary way of providing for a dependent party in divorce;
however, as amended, § 504 of the IMDMA outlines twelve factors
that a court must consider when determining the amount and duration
of a maintenance award.4 7 The twelfth factor allows courts to con-
45. See DAVIS & YAZICI, supra note 11, at 187. "The three most common forms of mainte-
nance awarded by Illinois courts pursuant to § 504 are permanent maintenance, rehabilitative
maintenance, and reviewable maintenance." Id.
46. Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, Pub. Act No. 87-881, § 504(a)(1), 1992
Ill. Laws 1023. See also DAVIS & YAZICI, supra note 11, at 189 (discussing change in legislative
and judicial attitudes toward maintenance with case citations). See generally Drefchinski, supra
note 21, at 581 for a more extensive analysis of the pros and cons of maintenance in Illinois and a
discussion of whether maintenance should simply be abolished rather than reformed.
47. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/504(a)(l)-(12). "[A]s the court deems just," and "without regard
to marital misconduct," the court may award maintenance, paid from the income or property of
the other spouse after the consideration of
all relevant factors, including:
(1) the income and property of each party, including marital property apportioned and
non-marital property assigned to the party seeking maintenance;
(2) the needs of each party;
(3) the present and future earning capacity of each party;
(4) any impairment of the present and future earning capacity of the party seeking
maintenance due to that party devoting time to domestic duties or having forgone or
delayed education, training, employment, or career opportunities due to the marriage;
(5) the time necessary to enable the party seeking maintenance to acquire appropriate
education, training, and employment, and whether that party is able to support himself
or herself through appropriate employment or is the custodian of a child making it
appropriate that the custodian not seek employment;
(6) the standard of living established during the marriage;
(7) the duration of the marriage;
(8) the age and the physical and emotional condition of both parties;
(9) the tax consequences of the property division upon the respective economic circum-
stances of the parties;
(10) contributions and services by the party seeking maintenance to the education,
training, career or career potential, or license of the other spouse;
(11) any valid agreement of the parties; and
(12) any other factor that the court expressly finds to be just and equitable.
Id.
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sider any other factors that are "just and equitable, "48 which provides
the court with great latitude to consider the needs of the parties. 49
Issues of maintenance security and other post-death protections be-
come particularly relevant in permanent maintenance situations. Illi-
nois courts have recognized a trend of awarding permanent
maintenance in the following situations: (1) when one spouse has
raised children and supported the family for a significant period of
time; (2) when full-time domestic duties have substantially impaired
skills for continued employment; (3) when one spouse has assumed
full responsibility for the family while the other spouse was obtaining
an education and becoming established in a profession; and (4) when
a spouse is not employable or is employable only at a low income
compared to his or her previous standard of living.50
In situations where something less than permanent maintenance is
just and equitable, the IMDMA also refers to "earning capacity"5 1
and limitations to attaining employment 52 as opening the door for re-
habilitative maintenance.53 The goal of rehabilitative maintenance in
Illinois
is not limited to restoring a former spouse to his or her pre-marital
economic status or to the status he or she could have achieved but
48. 750 luL. COMP. STAr. 5/504(a)(12).
49. See In re Marriage of Mohr, 631 N.E.2d 785, 790 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (allowing courts to
consider the amount of a permanent maintenance award from a subsequent marriage as a factor
in considering the amount and duration of the current award); see also In re Marriage of Gat-
tone, 739 N.E.2d 998, 1005-07 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (concluding that the wife's relocation to Illi-
nois, absence from the job market, health problems, and age were all legitimate factors for a
court to consider when determining whether an award for rehabilitative maintenance was proper
and whether the court may order a spouse to pay for health insurance).
50. In re Marriage of Schiltz, 833 N.E.2d 412, 415-16 (111. App. Ct. 2005). The Illinois trend
was originally noted in In re Marriage of Rubinstein, 495 N.E.2d 659, 665 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). In
Rubinstein, the court reversed and remanded a case involving a husband and wife who were
married after college. Id. at 660. The wife agreed to be the sole source of support for the family
while the husband completed medical school and residency requirements. Id. She supported the
family for nine years. Id. After the husband entered practice, the wife completed her degree.
Id. In a frustrated opinion, the court remanded the case stressing that
Illinois courts give consideration to a more permanent award of maintenance to wives
who have undertaken to have children, raise and support the family, and who have lost
or been substantially impaired in maintaining their skills for continued employment
during the years when the husband was getting his education and becoming established.
Id. at 665.
51. 750 l1 -. COMP. STAT. 5/504(a)(3).
52. 750 lu . Come. SrAr. 5/504(a)(5).
53. Miles N. Beermann & Howard A. London, Rehabilitative Maintenance in Illinois, 75 lu,.
B.J. 658, 661 (1987). "The policy underlying rehabilitative maintenance is to sever the financial
ties between a former married couple in an expeditious, but just, manner and make each spouse
independent of the other as soon as practicable." In re Marriage of Cantrell, 732 N.E.2d 797, 801
(Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (citing In re Marriage of Carpenter, 677 N.E.2d 463 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)).
[Vol. 60:713722
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for the marriage. . . . [T]he full purpose of maintenance is to help
encourage a spouse to regain dormant employment skills or develop
new ones and, in proper circumstances, to provide supplementary
income where the spouse cannot support herself in her pre-dissolu-
tion lifestyle. 54
In cases where rehabilitative maintenance is appropriate, post-death
protection-such as life insurance-becomes important only for the
period of time during which the spouse is required to provide mainte-
nance for the purpose of cushioning the dependant spouse until self-
sufficiency is possible.55
In many cases, an award of rehabilitative maintenance occurs when
a party is employed but not earning enough to cover monthly ex-
penses. 56 Unless the evidence clearly shows exactly when a dependent
spouse will be able to support him or herself, the court may not specu-
late about a definite end period but must designate the award as re-
viewable.57 Again, the twelve factors enumerated in the IMDMA
provide the court with broad discretion when determining the appro-
priate duration of a maintenance award and whether or not an award
is reviewable.
C. Life Insurance as Security for Maintenance Awards
Consumers buy life insurance to protect their dependents against
financial hardship if they should unexpectedly die. 58 Statistics com-
piled by the American Council of Life Insurers show that most Ameri-
54. Beermann & London, supra note 53, at 661-62 (describing Illinois rehabilitative mainte-
nance as "rehabilitative maintenance plus").
55. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Pearson, 603 N.E.2d 720, 727 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
The IMDMA authorizes rehabilitative, or time limited, maintenance so that the
spouse receiving the support has the incentive to use diligence in getting the training or
skills necessary to attain self-sufficiency. This goal must be balanced against a realistic
appraisal of the likelihood that the spouse receiving support will be able to support
herself in some reasonable approximation of the standard of living established during
the marriage, especially where the marriage was of a long duration and the spouse has
had a long absence from the labor market.
Id. (citations omitted).
56. See Beermann & London, supra note 53, at 662.
57. Id. at 663.
58. AMERICAN COUNCIL OF Lin- INSURERS, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 63 (2010). There
are two types of life insurance: (1) coverage for a specified "term," and (2) permanent coverage
for one's "whole life." Id. Term insurance provides coverage for a specified period of time. Id.
at 64. Commonly there is a fixed premium, and so long as the premium is paid, payment is made
to the named beneficiary in the event of the insured's death. Id. When the term insurance ex-
pires-because the premium is not paid or the policy is purposely not renewed-no build up of
cash value occurs. Id. In contrast, whole life insurance provides protection for as long as the
insured remains living. Id. Unlike term insurance, whole life coverage builds a cash value over
time, which the insured can borrow against in the event of a family financial emergency, retire-
ment, or on any other need basis. If the insured decides to terminate the policy for any reason,
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cans depend on some form of life insurance to provide economic
security to their loved ones.59 When the insured person-the policy-
holder and often the family breadwinner-dies, the insurance com-
pany must pay the proceeds of the policy directly to the named
beneficiary. 60 In this way, life insurance proceeds provide a guaran-
teed replacement for lost income upon the death of a family wage
earner, indemnity against outstanding family debts or medical debt
accrued as a result of the insured's death, and general assurance that
the surviving family can live "financially independently and in their
accustomed style." 61 Because of the various securities life insurance
provides, the decision to obtain life insurance commonly follows the
decision to marry or have children; therefore, it is not surprising that
life insurance is an issue in divorce because "[j]ust as life insurance
can indemnify against the loss of a spouse or parent during marriage,
so too can it indemnify against the loss of a former spouse or parent
afterward." 62
Today, agreements to maintain existing life insurance policies or
take out new policies to secure maintenance obligations are often a
part of marital settlement agreements because family law practitioners
do not want their clients to end up in a precarious financial situation if
their ex-spouses should unexpectedly die. Courts tend to have the
same concern 63 and typically have found that maintenance awards se-
cured by life insurance obligations are an appropriate way of insuring
against future financial difficulty for a dependent spouse. For exam-
ple, returning to the previous hypothetical, 64 as part of a property set-
tlement, the court may require Jack to assign ownership of an existing
policy to Jill but continue to pay the premiums. However, because the
fiscal benefits of life insurance policies are generally triggered by the
he or she receives the cash value of the policy less any outstanding loans taken against the policy.
Id.
According to the American Council of Life Insurers, due to the creation of whole life policies
with investment and borrowing options, insurance does more than provide financial security for
families in the case of death. It has become a major family asset, an emergency savings system,
and an important estate-planning device. Id. at 63.
59. See id. In 2004, a reported 78% of American families owned some type of life insurance
policy. Id.
60. Kelvin H. Dickinson, Divorce and Life Insurance: Post Mortem Remedies for Breach of a
Duty to Maintain a Policy for a Designated Beneficiary, 61 Mo. L. Rlv. 533, 535 (1996).
61. Id. at 534.
62. Id. at 538.
63. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Walker, 899 N.E.2d 1097, 1111 (11. App. Ct. 2008). "My biggest
concern about maintenance is, ma'am, if I were to award you the maintenance and he would,
unfortunately, walk out here and get hit by a car, the maintenance is gone because it ends upon
his death." Id. (quoting trial court).
64. See supra text accompanying note 13.
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death of the policyholder, some Illinois courts have viewed the main-
tenance of life insurance premiums as a post-death maintenance
award or a post-death security;65 other courts question whether the
maintenance of a life insurance policy equates to post-death payment
because "[a]n insured makes no payments on a life-insurance policy
after his death." 66 Although the Third and Fourth District Illinois Ap-
pellate Courts would agree that a separate written agreement exe-
cuted by Jack and Jill requiring Jack to maintain Jill as the beneficiary
on his policy is enforceable regardless of whether life insurance is con-
sidered post-death maintenance, "whether the court has the power to
order the husband to maintain his life insurance policy for the benefit
of the former wife as a means of alimony" 67 is a matter of
disagreement.
D. Conflicting Interpretations of § 510(c)
1. Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District
In 1993, before the recent cases of Ellinger and Walker, the fourth
district struggled with the issue of life insurance security as post-death
maintenance. In the case of In re Marriage of Vernon, the fourth dis-
trict affirmed the trial court's judgment for the dissolution of a thirty-
year marriage,68 requiring the husband to maintain his former wife as
the beneficiary of his already existing life insurance policy until fur-
ther order of the court.69 The Vernon court interpreted § 510(c) as
65. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Clarke, 465 N.E.2d 975, 977 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (holding that a
court has no authority to require security for the payment of maintenance after the death of the
obligor and that insurance on the life of the obligor would amount to such security).
66. Walker, 899 N.E.2d at 1110; In re Marriage of Vernon, 625 N.E.2d 823, 827 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993) ("Section 510[(c)] prohibits maintenance payments after an obligor's death, not payments
during an obligor's life which have some effect after his death.").
67. Walker, 899 N.E.2d at 1111.
68. Vernon, 625 N.E.2d at 825. Carl and Ruth Vernon were married in August 1962 and had
two children-both of whom were emancipated at the time of the dissolution proceedings-and
filed for divorce in October 1990. Id. At the time of their divorce, Ruth was fifty years old and
had physical limitations, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, chest pains, and wore an orthope-
dic shoe because of foot surgery for neuroma. Id. at 826. It was undisputed that during the
thirty-year marriage, Ruth was a homemaker who raised the two children, did the laundry,
cooked meals, cleaned the house, and never had a full time job. Id. She never made more than
$2,500 in any year of the marriage and she finished only the eighth grade. Id. Carl was fifty-five
years old at the time of the hearing, had worked as a store manager for twenty-three years, held
the elected office of township supervisor, and his total gross income in 1991 was $37,000. Id.
69. Id. at 825. In 1992 the court entered an order addressing property distribution, giving
Ruth the marital residence, the bulk of the tangible property, the Buick, all assets in her name,
one-half of Carl's pension, the freezer, and the lawn mower. Id. She was ordered to continue
paying the balance of the mortgage, while all other outstanding marital debts were assigned to
Carl. Id. Several months later, the judgment of dissolution ordered Carl Vernon to (1) pay
temporary maintenance of $950 per month for three years, (2) pay Ruth's health insurance for
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"prohibit[ing] maintenance payments after an obligor's death, not
payments during an obligor's life which have some effect after his
death."70 The court reasoned that § 102 of the IMDMA requires
§ 510(c) to be "liberally construed to make reasonable provisions for
spouses and minor children," including provisions for post-death pro-
tection.7' According to the court in Vernon, the fact that the IMDMA
does not contain a specific provision authorizing the court to provide
maintenance security actually broadens the court's power to authorize
post-death security. 72 The court pointed out that, because the
IMDMA was "not simply a revision of Illinois law" but a "uniform
act" completely replacing the old Divorce Act, it may be "inappropri-
ate to give much weight to the fact that the uniform act does not con-
tain specific provisions found in earlier Illinois statutes."73
By holding that a court may require a maintenance obligor to main-
tain insurance to protect against the "premature termination of main-
tenance" 74 without running afoul of § 510(c), the Vernon court
suggested that the fourth district's previous opinion in In re Marriage
of Clarke was wrongly decided to the extent that it relied on an erro-
neous interpretation of § 510(c). 75  In Clarke, the court held that
under § 510(c) a court does not have the authority to order a spouse
or the estate of that spouse to make payments beyond death or to
require a spouse to secure maintenance to the other spouse post-death
by making the other spouse a beneficiary of a life insurance policy or
any other contract payable at the death of the payor spouse. 76 The
appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court, denying the
wife any life insurance security for her $3,500 per month unallocated
maintenance award.77 In interpreting the language of § 510(c), the
court concluded that the word "approve" indicates that "there must
one year, and (3) maintain life insurance through his employment, naming Ruth as the sole
beneficiary until further order of the court. Id.
70. Id. at 828. For example, "[i]f a court awards a large amount of property instead of mainte-
nance . . . that property will be available to the obligee after the obligor's death." Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.; see also Steven R. Lake, Life Insurance Issues in Divorce Proceedings Demand Legis-
lation, C. DAILY L. BULL., Sept. 1, 1994, at 5.
73. Lake, supra note 72, at 5.
74. Id.
75. Vernon, 625 N.E.2d at 827. Because the petitioner did not raise it in his brief, the court
declined to address the application and reversal of Clarke. But the court's opinion contains a
lengthy discussion of the holding in Clarke. Id. at 827-28.
76. In re Marriage of Clarke, 465 N.E.2d 975, 976 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
77. Id. The appellate decision contains hardly any recitation of the specifics of the property
settlement, the length of the marriage, or the physical condition/financial situation of the parties.
See generally id. In comparison to the three pages of facts included in the appellate court's
decision in Vernon, the Clarke decision is slim on facts, to say the least.
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be a pre-existing 'act' or 'thing' for the court to approve."78 Accord-
ing to the court, in the context of § 510(c) that "act" or "thing" is the
written or oral agreement of the parties.79 If an agreement between
the parties does not exist, then the court has no authority under
§ 510(c) to order maintenance beyond death, including any type of
post-death security such as life insurance.80 Moreover, the court
found that a failure of the legislature to include the security provision
of the former Divorce Act in the IMDMA "evinces an intent to with-
draw the authority from the court to require such security."8'
2. Current District Split: The Third and Fourth District Illinois
Appellate Courts
In early 2008, in Ellinger, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Third
District held that a court may not impose a duty to maintain life insur-
ance as security for maintenance on an ex-spouse without violating
§ 510(c). 8 2 In order to ascertain the meaning of the language used by
the legislature, the court contrasted the language of § 510(c) prohibit-
ing post-death maintenance with the language of § 503(g) authorizing
post-death protection for child support recipients.83 The court rea-
soned that because § 503(g) specifically grants courts the discretion to
designate assets as security for child support in a § 503(g) trust, the
omission of similar language for the security of spousal support
presumes "that the legislature intended different results by the differ-
ent language." 84  Because the applicability of the fourth district's
opinion in Clarke was raised, the court recognized Clarke as good law
and defended the opinion by stating that the Vernon court's rejection
of Clarke was "obiter dicta."85
Several months later, in Walker, the fourth district fired back at the
third district's opinion in Ellinger disagreeing with its interpretation of
78. Id. at 977.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 978 (citing Goedde v. Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 7, 157 N.E.2d 266 (1959)).
82. In re Marriage of Ellinger, 882 N.E.2d 692, 695 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). Again, in denying
protection for a spousal support obligation, the court in Ellinger, like the court in Clarke, gives a
sparse recitation of the facts. Here, the appellate court's opinion merely states that the husband
had purchased his existing life insurance policy in 1962, the couple was married in 1985, and filed
for divorce in 2006. Id. at 693. The trial court's final judgment required husband Gary Ellinger
to pay his wife monthly maintenance until the first occurring "statutory termination event" and
to maintain her as the sole beneficiary on his life insurance policy, "so long as he shall have an
obligation to pay maintenance to [her]." Id.
83. Id. at 695.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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§ 510(c). The fourth district held that the liberal construction of § 510
and § 504 authorizes a trial court "to award a form of security for a
maintenance obligation, not necessarily limited to life insurance." 86
In so holding, the court affirmed the trial court's permanent mainte-
nance award to the ex-wife of $3,000 a month through May 2014 and
$1,640 thereafter, which was secured by a court order requiring the
husband to maintain a life insurance policy for the sole benefit of his
wife.87 The court reasoned that the language "or otherwise approved
by the court" found in § 510(c) referred to the previous language
mentioning a separate agreement between the parties. The court de-
termined an order requiring life insurance in this case and in the pre-
vious decision in Clarke did not violate § 510(c) because in both the
facts of Clarke and the facts at hand, the court had before it a detailed
property settlement and an agreement to submit matters to the court
for determination which the court may "otherwise approve."88 The
court reasoned that these agreements satisfied the § 510(c) require-
ments. 89 In addition, the court noted that court-mandated life insur-
ance does not necessarily violate § 510(c)'s post-death prohibition
because "[a]n insured makes no payments on a life insurance policy
after his death . . . [and] the insurance company, not the insured's
estate, pays the proceeds to the ex-wife upon the insured's death";
therefore, life insurance is not necessarily a form of "postmortem
alimony."90
The court in Walker also analyzed the language of § 503 and § 510
concerning child support, pointing out that the IMDMA does not spe-
cifically authorize that child support may be secured by life insurance.
Instead, the authorization is broad and allows for "setting aside a por-
tion of an estate to pay that child support," allowing the court to
broadly interpret the Act and do justice by the parties.91 The court
highlighted the ideas of justice and equity several times in the opinion,
noting that if the court is not given broad discretion post-death, then a
judge trying to make a fair property division "cannot give much
weight to the fact that the ex-spouse is ordered to pay maintenance." 9 2
86. In re Marriage of Walker, 899 N.E.2d 1097, 1108 (111. App. Ct. 2008).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1109.
89. Id. at 1109-10.
90. Id. at 1110.
91. Id.
92. Id. If a judge cannot protect his evaluation of the parties' situations and resulting mainte-
nance award, then "[t]hat order may result in the ex-spouse paying hundreds of thousands of
dollars or it may result in him paying almost nothing if he died quickly." Id.
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According to the court in Walker, "[t]he legislature does not require
such uncertainty." 93
F. General Rules of Statutory Interpretation in Illinois
In Illinois, statutes dealing with and providing for the dissolution of
marriage have been strictly construed using plain-meaning interpreta-
tion.94 The primary rule of strict statutory interpretation is to ascer-
tain the intent of the legislature.95 The best evidence of legislative
intent is the plain meaning of the terms of the statute.96 Under Illinois
Supreme Court precedent, "clear and unambiguous support statutes
are not considered subject to other modes of interpretation or modifi-
cation." 97 Therefore, "[w]hen the language of the statute is unambig-
uous, the court may not depart from the language and read into the
statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions."98
Plain-meaning interpretation involves a strict conjunctive and dis-
junctive reading of statutory phrases. Phrases separated by the word
"and" are interpreted in the conjunctive.99 In contrast, "or" is used in
a statute to signify the disjunctive.100 Statutory phrases separated by
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rittmeyer, 438 N.E.2d 237, 240 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
95. In re Marriage of Logston, 469 N.E.2d 167, 171 (Ill. 1984) ("As often stated, the primary
rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the legislature's intent.").
96. Id. ("[A] court looks first to the statutory language itself. If the language is clear, the
court must give it effect and should not look to extrinsic aids for construction.").
97. 3A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SIIAMBIE SINGER, STARITTES AND STArrrORY CONSTRUC-
TION 443-44 (7th ed. 2010) (citing Finley v. Finley, 410 N.E.2d 12, 16 (Ill. 1980)).
The plain language of section 510(c) states that provisions for child support are termi-
nated by the child's emancipation, unless otherwise agreed in writing or by court order.
Where the intention of the legislature is clearly expressed, the plain meaning of the
statute must be given effect. Thus, it was not the purpose of section 510(c) of the new
act to change the law with regard to unilateral pro rata reduction of lump-sum periodic
support payments. The statement in that section that the provisions for the support of
a child are terminated by emancipation is simply declarative of the common law rule
that the obligation to support terminates upon emancipation.
Id.
98. Illinois v. Patterson, 721 N.E.2d 797, 801 (il. App. Ct. 1999).
99. 1A SINGER & SINGER, supra note 97, at 177-79. "This court long ago observed the obvi-
ous: 'The conjunction "and" . .. signifies and expresses the relation of addition.'" Illinois v. 1945
N. 31st St., 841 N.E.2d 928, 939-40 (Ill. 2005) (quoting City of LaSalle v. Kostka, 60 N.E. 72, 74
(111. 1901)) (interpreting § 8 of the Forfeiture Act).
100. See SINGER & SINGER, supra note 97, at 180-90 (citing Elementary Sch. Dist. 159 v.
Schiller, 849 N.E.2d 349, 359 (I. 2006)) "The word 'or' is disjunctive. As used in its ordinary
sense, the word 'or' marks an alternative indicating the various parts of the sentence which it
connects are to be taken separately. In other words, 'or' means 'or.' Disjunctive therefore con-
notes two different alternatives." Id. (citations omitted).
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the use of a disjunctive "or" require the listed alternatives to be
treated separately. 101
However, it is a generally accepted principle of statutory construc-
tion that subsections of an Act are not written in a vacuum. 102 There-
fore, subsections must be considered in reference to other subsections
dealing with the same or substantially similar subject matter.103 Two
provisions containing similar or identical language must be inter-
preted in harmony, and when the legislature uses certain language in
one part of the Act and different language in the other, it can be as-
sumed that different results were intended.104 In Illinois, when the
language of a subsection is determined to be ambiguous, the court
must then look to the statute as a whole to ascertain the intent of the
legislature.105 However, great care is required in whole-statute inter-
pretation. The fact that two statutory provisions contain similar or
even identical language does not mean that they are necessarily sub-
ject to the exact same interpretation. The similarity of statutory sub-
sections is informed by the purpose and context of the sections. 106
If after plain-meaning interpretation and whole-statute analysis are
exhausted a court determines that statutory language is still ambigu-
ous-in other words susceptible to two interpretations-then and only
then does "it become[ ] proper to examine sources other than its lan-
guage for evidence of legislative intent."107 In Illinois, the first extrin-
sic source for interpretation is the old law or the Uniform Law from
which the new law is derived. 08
G. The Illinois Supreme Court's Interpretation of § 510(c)
Although it is inexplicably not cited by any of the appellate court
decisions dealing with post-death maintenance issues, the Illinois Su-
preme Court interpreted the language of § 510(c) in 1985. In Free-
man,109 the Illinois Supreme Court stated that the trial judge
101. See 1A SINGIER & SINGER, supra note 97, at 189-90.
102. 2A SINGER & SINGER, supra note 97, at 206.
103. See id. at 206-08.
104. See id. at 224-27.
105. Id. at 212.
106. Id. at 224.
107. In re Marriage of Logston, 469 N.E.2d 167, 172 (111. 1984).
108. See, e.g., id.
109. In re Marriage of Freeman, 478 N.E.2d 326, 326 (111. 1985). The Illinois Supreme Court
decided Freeman after the fourth district appellate court's decision in Clarke; however, because
the issue in Freeman concerned gross maintenance and the remarriage termination event, Clarke
is not cited. Neither Ellinger, Walker, nor Vernon, which were decided post-Freeman, cite the
Freeman decisions. Clearly, the supreme court's interpretation of the language of § 510(c) is
binding on the district and appellate courts. There is no explanation for why it is uncited by any
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'misconstrued the phrase 'otherwise approved by the court' when he
read it to modify the word 'agreement."1 10 According to the supreme
court, a reading that requires a court to approve a written agreement
of the parties "violates the basic canon of statutory construction that,
ordinarily, relative or qualifying words or clauses modify words or
phrases which are immediately preceding and do not modify those
which are more remote."'1 '
In Freeman, the trial judge ordered maintenance with the condition
that the payments terminated upon the death of either party but not
on the remarriage of the ex-wife, the maintenance recipient.112 The
likelihood of the ex-wife's remarriage was discussed in front of the
judge and he specifically decided that the payments should extend be-
yond her inevitable remarriage. 13 The husband argued that regard-
less of the judge's good intentions or the inevitability of his ex-wife's
remarriage, ordering maintenance beyond remarriage violated
§ 510(c).11 4 The husband argued that the language of § 510(c), read in
conjunction with § 504(b), expressly provides that maintenance
awards terminate upon the remarriage of the receiving party unless
there is an agreement by the parties embodied in the separation
agreement and thereafter approved by the court.115 On the day the
order was entered, there was a substituted judge.116 He ruled that
§ 510(c) required, as a matter of law, that maintenance payments ter-
minate on remarriage if the parties had not agreed otherwise." 7
The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed with the husband's argument
and the substituted judge's reasoning. 8 The court held that "the leg-
islature intended to allow future maintenance to survive the remar-
riage of the receiving party if the judge approves."" 9 Applying a
strict plain-meaning interpretation to the language of § 510(c), the su-
preme court affirmed the original order of the trial judge, noting that
although the order may not have been perfectly clear, the original trial
judge's intentions were "a good example of the individual fashioning
court addressing the issue of a trial court's authority to order post-death maintenance pursuant
to § 510(c).
110. Id. at 330.
111. Id. (citing Illinois v. Thomas, 256 N.E.2d 794 (Ill. 1970)).
112. Id. at 329.
113. Id.
114. Id. At the time, the statute was numbered § 510(b). Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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of remedy which is now possible under the language of the Act." 120
Here, the judge's order expressly indicated that maintenance pay-
ments would terminate upon death but would not terminate upon re-
marriage. The court held that the plain language of § 510(c) clearly
authorized the judge to make such an order, so long as it was consis-
tent with a just and equitable distribution of the marital property.121
H. Death and Taxes
As many family practitioners well know, divorce and tax law are
intimately related because payments made and property transferred
between a husband and wife in connection with divorce will affect tax-
able income and allow certain deductions to be taken by the parties.
Almost all tax issues arising from divorce are controlled by §§ 71 and
215 of the Internal Revenue Code. 12 2 Pursuant to the general rule,
§ 71 includes amounts received as maintenance in the payee's gross
income,123 while § 215 deducts an equal amount from taxable income
of the payor. However, the following contingencies laid out in § 71
must be satisfied in order for maintenance to be taxable to the payee
and deductible by the payor pursuant to either section:
A. The payments must be in cash.
B. The payment must be made pursuant to a divorce or separation
instrument....
C. The spouses must be living in separate households ....
D. The payments must terminate at payee's death ....
E. The payments cannot be fixed for children's support.
F. The parties must not have opted out of deductible/taxable ali-
mony .... 124
Thus, in connection with the Internal Revenue Code §§ 71 and 215,
the purpose of a statutory termination event terminating maintenance
at the death of either party pursuant to § 510(c) is to automatically
satisfy the requirements for deductible/taxable payments. In fact,
when the § 510(c) amendments were enacted in 1981, adding the lan-
guage "unless otherwise agreed by the parties in a written separation
agreement set forth in the judgment or otherwise approved by the
court" ensured that maintenance awards made either by agreement of
the parties or court order-which were subsequently incorporated in
the judgment-retained legal significance, thereby allowing the payor
a tax deduction equal to alimony payments made within the taxable
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. I.R.C. §§ 71, 215 (2006).
123. § 71.
124. DAVIS & YAZICI, supra note 11, at 1325.
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year.125 The amendment's purpose was recognized in the case of In
re Marriage of Mass, in which the court stated that one of the primary
reasons for clarifying the language was to allow for a husband to get a
federal tax deduction for maintenance payments made beyond an ex-
wife's remarriage when maintenance payments were required by the
judgment. 126 Therefore, unless agreed to by the parties or ordered by
the court, § 510(c) ensures that payments made pursuant to the sec-
tion automatically qualify for deductible/taxable IRS treatment if they
satisfy the additional requirements. The Tax Reform Act of 1986127
made state statutory termination events regarding the death of the
payee more significant because absent an agreement of the parties or
an order of the court, state law could control the deductibility of the
payments. IRS Notice 87-9 explains,
Under pre-Tax Reform Act law, payments could qualify as ali-
mony or separate maintenance payments only if the payor spouse's
liability to continue to make such payments terminated upon the
death of the payee spouse. Moreover, it was required that the di-
vorce or separate maintenance instrument expressly state that the
liability to make payments would so terminate, even if, independent
of the terms of the agreement, the liability to continue to make the
payments would terminate upon the death of the payee spouse as a
result of State law.
Under the Tax Reform Act, as under pre-Tax Reform Act law,
payments may qualify as alimony or separate maintenance pay-
ments only if the payor spouse's liability terminates upon the death
of the payee spouse. The termination of liability need not, however,
125. See 82nd Ill. Gen. Assem., Transcript of Senate Proceedings, May 19,1981, at 278 (state-
ment of Sen. Marovitz).
126. In re Marriage of Mass, 431 N.E.2d 1, 13-14 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
Hence, one of the primary reasons for abolishing merger was to allow for a husband to
get a federal tax deduction for maintenance payments made beyond a wife's remar-
riage. Since the legislature abolished merger to allow such a result, then obviously the
legislature intended for parties to be able to enter into written separation agreements
under section 502 of the IMDMA which called for maintenance payments to be paid
beyond the receiving spouse's remarriage. . . . Therefore, it becomes clear that the
amendment to section 510(b) which goes into effect on January 1, 1982, is merely a
clarification of what the legislature originally intended when it enacted the IMDMA.
Thus, as of the effective date of the IMDMA, October 1, 1977, we hold that parties
have been able to enter into written separation agreements in accordance with section
502 of the IMDMA which provides for enforceable maintenance terms that extend
beyond the terminating events of section 510(b).
Id.
127. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, Sec. 1843(b). "Subparagraph (D) of section
71(b)(1) (defining alimony or separate maintenance payments) is amended by striking out 'and
the divorce or separation instrument states that there is no such liability."' Id.
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be expressly stated in the instrument if, for example, the termina-
tion would occur by operation of State law. 128
By designating maintenance payments as terminating at the death of
either party, § 510(c) of the IMDMA ensures that maintenance
awarded pursuant to the statute qualifies for deductible/taxable treat-
ment under I.R.C. § 71, unless otherwise agreed by the parties or the
court.
Unlike maintenance, child support is neither deductible to the
payor nor taxable to the payee pursuant to § 71(c).1 2 9 Although there
are some ways in which unallocated maintenance may be made to in-
clude child support and maintain a deductible/taxable status, if the
support terminates at a time related to the child-for example, a child
contingency-such support is not deductible.130 Thus, any court-or-
dered extension of child support beyond the provided statutory termi-
nation events listed in § 510(d) has no effect on the taxable or
deductible nature of the support.
III. ANALYSIS
Applying both a strict plain-meaning interpretation of the language
of § 510(c) and a whole-statute analysis, it is clear that the Illinois leg-
islature intended to authorize trial courts to order and approve a vari-
ety of post-death maintenance provisions. Consequently, a trial court
may protect the future financial needs of a dependent spouse through
the use of court-ordered life insurance or various other forms of post-
death support. It is inappropriate to move beyond the language of the
IMDMA to interpret the language of § 510(c) because the intent of
the legislature can be ascertained from its plain meaning. Interpreta-
tions of § 510(c) that do not strictly interpret its language violate fun-
damental canons and do not ascertain the true intent of the
legislature. If ambiguity is assumed, applying a whole-statute inter-
pretation of § 510(c) is proper. However, whole-statute analysis only
justifies comparing § 510(c) with subsections of the Act that have sim-
ilar purposes. The exceptions to termination events listed in § 510(c)
have a distinguishable function and purpose from the use of child sup-
port trusts authorized by § 503(g) and the termination events listed in
§ 510(d). Simply put, the purpose of terminating child support is dis-
128. I.R.S. Notice 87-9, 1987-1 C.B. 421.
129. I.R.C. § 71(c)(1) (2006). "Subsection (a) shall not apply to that part of any payment
which in terms of the divorce or separation instrument fix (in terms of an amount of money or a
part of the payment) as a sum which is payable for the support of children of the payor spouse."
Id.
130. See DAVIS & YAZICI, supra note 11, at 1327.
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tinguishable from the purpose of terminating spousal support. There-
fore, it is an improper application of whole-statue analysis to compare
the judicial discretion authorized in these sections to that authorized
by the language of § 510(c). So long as the court order is just and
equitable, the language of § 510(c) as interpreted by plain-meaning
and whole-statute analysis authorizes a court to provide post-death
maintenance. Limiting this authority is both contrary to the true in-
tent of the Illinois legislature and inappropriate in the area of marital
dissolution where the court's authority to order maintenance has a
significant impact on the future financial security of the parties.
A. Plain-Meaning Interpretation
Interpreting § 510(c) requires first looking at the language of the
section and giving that language its plain and ordinary meaning.131 As
noted earlier, this involves a strict interpretation of all disjunctive and
conjunctive phrases in the statute.132 A strict reading of § 510(c)
reveals that the Illinois legislature intended to authorize courts to pro-
vide post-death maintenance if the case requires.
Guided by the conjunctive/disjunctive statutory canon, the Illinois
Supreme Court has concluded that in enacting § 510(c), "the legisla-
ture intended to allow future maintenance to survive the remarriage
of the receiving party if the judge approves."1 33 The court stated that
under § 510(c), the phrase "otherwise approved by the court" does
not modify the word "agreement." 134 Consequently, the phrase "oth-
erwise approved by the court" is remote from the phrase "agreement
by the parties" because it is separated by a disjunctive "or." Accord-
ing to the supreme court, a reading that requires the court to approve
a written agreement of the parties "violates the basic canon of statu-
tory construction that, ordinarily, relative or qualifying words or
clauses modify words or phrases which are immediately preceding and
do not modify those which are more remote."1 35
131. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that "absent a clear indication
of legislative intent to the contrary, the language of the statute in question controls its construc-
tion." Ill. Dep't of Pub. Aid v. Bowen, 808 F.2d 571, 574 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Cenance, 452 U.S. 155 (1981)). "[A] primary rule of statutory construction re-
quires a court to ascertain the intention of the legislature and give it effect. In so doing, the
language of the statute must be given its plain and ordinary meaning." Sostak v. Sostak, 447
N.E.2d 1345, 1349-50 (111. App. Ct. 1983) (citing In re Marriage of Justema, 420 N.E.2d 796 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1981)).
132. See In re Marriage of Freeman, 478 N.E.2d 326, 330 (Ill. 1985).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. (citing Illinois v. Thomas, 256 N.E.2d 794 (Ill. 1970)).
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The holding of the Illinois Supreme Court in Freeman requires that
the phrases in § 510(c) be read disjunctively. Therefore, if the provi-
sions of a maintenance award are silent on the issue of termination,
§ 510(c) sets termination at either the (1) death of either party, (2) the
remarriage of the party receiving maintenance, or (3) the cohabitation
of the party receiving maintenance. However, the parties can agree in
writing to different termination events or the judge can choose to
"write out" certain statutory termination events altogether by ex-
pressly providing in his order that maintenance does not terminate
upon death, remarriage, or cohabitation. 13 6 A disjunctive reading of
the phrase is dispositive of the argument that parties must first reach
agreement before a judge can approve post-death maintenance.' 37
Under a disjunctive reading, a court's approval of post-death mainte-
nance is not triggered by a written agreement of the parties; rather, it
stands alone.138 This disjunctive reading of § 510(c) is consistent with
both the generally accepted principles of statutory construction and
the supreme court's interpretation of the plain meaning of the lan-
guage of § 510(c) in Freeman.
Although the court in Ellinger stated that the case hinged on "the
statutory construction of provisions in the Illinois Marriage and Disso-
lution of Marriage Act" and that the "best evidence of the legisla-
ture's intent is the statutory language itself," the court failed in its
application of the articulated rule.139 The court simply skipped the
primary analysis of the plain language of § 510(c) required by both the
supreme court and the rules of statutory construction, choosing in-
stead to analyze § 510(c) in relation to § 510(d).140 It is well estab-
lished that when the legislature uses different language in similar
provisions in the same act, it intended different results.141 This type of
subsection comparison is a form of whole-statute analysis. However,
whole-statute analysis is secondary to a determination of ambiguity
136. Id. The legislature intended to allow future maintenance to survive the remarriage of the
receiving party, the cohabitation of the parties, or the death of the parties if the judge approves.
See id. at 328, 330.
137. This reading is dispositive of the argument in Clarke that if an agreement between the
parties does not exist, then the court has no authority under § 510(c) to order maintenance
beyond death, remarriage, or cohabitation. 465 N.E.2d 975, 977 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). A disjunc-
tive reading also cures the need of the court in Walker to justify the trial court's authorization of
post-death maintenance by pointing to the "detailed property settlement agreement" before the
court, as a basis for triggering judicial discretion to make post-death orders. 899 N.E.2d 1097,
1109 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
138. See Freeman, 478 N.E.2d at 330 (allowing maintenance to survive statutory termination
events if the judge sees fit).
139. In re Marriage of Ellinger, 882 N.E.2d 692, 694 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
140. Id.
141. See 1A SINGER & SINGER, supra note 97, at 224.
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and the analysis of the plain meaning of that language. 142 While Ellin-
ger failed to address the plain meaning of § 510(c), the courts in
Clarke and Walker did, but they interpreted it incorrectly.
In Clarke, the court argued that the language "otherwise approved
by the court" meant that the court's authority in this case is not inher-
ent because "[w]ithin the context of section 510(c) there must be a
pre-existing 'act' or 'thing' for the court to approve."14 3 Turning to
Black's Law Dictionary for a definition, the court noted that the word
"approve" means to "be satisfied with; to confirm, ratify, sanction, or
consent to some act or thing done by another."144 According to the
court, "approve" is distinguishable from "authorize" because "ap-
prove" is dependent on some act or thing done by another.14 5 There-
fore, the court concluded that the court's authority to order post-
death maintenance arises only when there is a written agreement of
the parties that (1) has been incorporated in the judgment and ap-
proved in that manner or (2) is "otherwise approved by the court."1 4 6
Applying this analysis to the facts, the court held that because there
was no agreement by the parties as to post-death security for the pay-
ment of unallocated maintenance, the trial court had no authority to
order security that extended beyond Mr. Clarke's death.14 7
In Walker, the court expressly disagreed with the holding in Clarke,
but not based on the court's interpretation of the plain meaning of the
language of § 510(c).14 8 Instead, the court disagreed with the conclu-
sion in Clarke that there was no agreement. In Walker, the court
stated that "[t]here was an agreement: a detailed property settlement
agreement and an agreement to submit matters to the court for deter-
mination including inter alia security for unallocated maintenance and
who should pay the premiums." 1 4 9 According to the court, the pres-
ence of a written agreement to provide $100,000 in insurance for the
child's college expenses was sufficient to satisfy the statutory require-
ment that a written agreement be submitted to the court for approval
142. See Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 561 N.E.2d 656, 661 (Ill. 1990) ("In interpreting a statute, the
primary rule, to which all other rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the lan-
guage used by the legislature."); see also Collins v. Bd. of Trs. of Firemen's Annuity & Benefit
Fund, 610 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (Ill. 1993) ("[W]e begin with the language of the statute.").
143. In re Marriage of Clarke, 465 N.E.2d 975, 977 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
144. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting BLACK'S LAw DIcrIONARY 94 (5th ed. 1979)).
145. Id.
146. Id. (quoting 750 ILL. COMP. STAr. 5/510(b) (2008)).
147. Id. at 979.
148. See In re Marriage of Walker, 899 N.E.2d 1097, 1109 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
149. Id.
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in order to trigger the court's authority to order life insurance security
for maintenance.150
The Illinois Supreme Court and generally accepted methods of stat-
utory construction require a strict interpretation of the plain meaning
of § 510(c). By interpreting the phrase "in a written agreement set
forth in the judgment or otherwise approved by the court"15' in the
conjunctive, the courts in Walker and Clarke violated a basic cannon
of statutory construction and disregarded the Illinois Supreme Court's
interpretation of the phrases in Freeman. By neglecting to apply
plain-meaning interpretation before applying a whole-statute analysis,
the court in Ellinger failed to ascertain the true intent of the Illinois
legislature. As stated above, a disjunctive reading of the section is
dispositive of the argument that parties must first reach agreement
before a judge can approve post-death maintenance. 152 Under a dis-
junctive reading, a court's approval of post-death maintenance is not
triggered by a written agreement of the parties; rather, it is triggered
by the discretion of the judge. Only an interpretation of the plain
meaning of § 510(c) that follows these maxims is in line with both the
supreme court's decision in Freeman and basic canons of statutory
construction. This type of interpretation reveals that (1) parties can
agree in writing to different termination events or (2) the judge can
expressly exclude the application of certain statutory termination
events altogether. Therefore, if a judge finds that a post-death main-
tenance award such as life insurance is just and equitable, he may ex-
tend maintenance beyond the death of the payor without violating
§ 510(c).
B. Whole-Statute Interpretation
In contrast to plain-meaning, whole-statute interpretation may be
applied to the language of § 510(c) if the language of the section is
ambiguous.1 53 However, as stated earlier, great care is required in
whole-statute interpretation. The fact that two statutory provisions
contain similar or even identical language does not mean that they are
necessarily subject to the exact same interpretation. The similarity of
statutory subsections is informed by the purpose and function of the
150. Id. at 1110.
151. 750 ILL. CoMP. STAr. 5/510(c).
152. See supra text accompanying note 137.
153. See 2A SINGER & SINGER, supra note 97, at 189-90. If the section is ambiguous, then two
provisions containing similar or identical language must be interpreted in harmony and when the
legislature uses certain language in one part of the act and different language in the other, it can
be assumed that different results were intended. Id.
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Sections.154 Comparing the language of two functionally distinguisha-
ble subsections of an Act will not effectively ascertain the true intent
of the legislature. When applied correctly, a whole-statute analysis
also shows that the legislature intended to authorize trial courts to
provide post-death maintenance if justice and equity require.
In determining whether the legislature intended § 510(c) to provide
a trial court with the authority to order post-death maintenance such
as life insurance the court in Ellinger and Walker applied whole-stat-
ute interpretation by comparing § 510(c) with several other provisions
in the Act relating to statutory termination events and support secur-
ity. To justify moving away from the plain language of § 510(c), the
court in Walker stated that "there is no doubt" that the language in
§ 510(c) is unclear and ambiguous and therefore subject to other
forms of statutory interpretation.155 However, in the Ellinger,
Vernon, and Clarke opinions, ambiguity was simply not discussed.
Regardless, the fact that § 510(c) has been interpreted differently by
different courts can be evidence that the language of the statute may
in fact be ambiguous. 56
In addition, the analysis of § 510(c) in Ellinger is, in effect, solely an
application of whole-statute interpretation that compares the lan-
guage of maintenance provisions and the language of child support
provisions.'57 However, just because the language used to describe
maintenance termination events in § 510(c) is similar to the language
used to describe termination events for child support, that does not
necessarily mean the court is bound by the interpretations of child
support subsections because the purpose of the termination events are
distinct and separate.158 For instance, as discussed earlier, § 71 of the
Internal Revenue Code requires maintenance payments to terminate
at the death of the payee in order to qualify for deductible/taxable
154. Id.
155. Walker, 899 N.E.2d at 1109.
156. See 2A SINGER & SINGER, supra note 97, at 189.
157. See In re Marriage of Ellinger, 882 N.E.2d 692, 694 (111. App. Ct. 2008).
158. In re Marriage of Dulyn, 411 N.E.2d 988,994 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980). The legislature enacted
§ 510(d) to guarantee support of a dependent child, even upon the death of the child support
payor. Id.
[T]his section guarantees the dependent minor child of divorced parents from loss of
support through disinheritance. While the court acknowledged that a divorced parent
is free to disinherit a child of his divorced marriage, it concluded that under this section,
he may do so only subject to the limited obligation of support.
Id.; see also In re Marriage of Schneider, 798 N.E.2d 1242, 1247 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). Just as child
support is always modifiable in order to protect the best interest of the child, child support does
not terminate at death, notwithstanding a separate agreement of the parties. Id.
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treatment. 59 Thus, one of the purposes of including death as a statu-
tory termination event for maintenance is to ensure that, unless other-
wise agreed by the parties or ordered by the court, maintenance
awards under § 510(c) automatically qualify for § 71 taxable/deducti-
ble treatment. In contrast to maintenance, pursuant to § 71(c), child
support payments are neither deductible to the payor nor taxable to
the payee regardless of the termination provisions. Therefore, while
termination provisions for maintenance can have significant federal
tax consequences, termination provisions for child support have no
such effect.
In addition, the mere presence of § 503(g), which grants trial courts
discretion to set aside a portion of the assets for the benefit of the
children, does not show that the legislature intended to tie the hands
of a trial court with regards to all forms of security for maintenance
obligations, because § 503(g) is distinguishable from § 510(c). Section
503(g) authorizes courts to establish trusts that are designed to protect
children, who are not parties to the negotiations that take place during
the dissolution process, when special circumstances show that children
may be in danger of financial insecurity.160 In short, § 503(g) autho-
rizes a court to protect dependent children from financial insecurity
based on a finding of special circumstances and is distinguishable from
the purpose and function of § 510(c). In contrast to § 503(g), § 510(c)
authorizes a court to protect a dependent spouse only in the case of
death. Unlike children who will benefit from the funds in a § 503(g)
trust if special circumstance other than the payor's death arise, a de-
pendent spouse will not be able to collect post-death maintenance-
such as life insurance-merely because the payor is incarcerated,161
suffering financial loss,1 6 2 or shows a pattern or unwillingness to pay
support.163 This makes these sections distinguishable. Therefore,
159. I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(D) (2006).
160. Subsection 503(g) provides for the creation of a support trust for children only when it is
necessary to "protect . . . the best interests of the children." 750 Iii. COMP. STA-r. 5/503(g)
(2008).
161. See DAVIS & YAZICI, supra note 11, at 182 (citing In re Marriage of Vucic, 576 N.E.2d
406 (111. App. Ct. 1991)). Evidence of a father's repetitive incarceration for theft supports a
finding for the establishment of a § 503(g) trust because of the father's current and reasonable
expected future inability to pay child support. Id.
162. Id. at 183 (citing In re Marriage of Hobson, 581 N.E.2d 388 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), which
found that the creation of a child support fund from the net proceeds of the sale of the marital
residence was the only reasonably certain source of child support).
163. Id. (citing In re Marriage of Petersen, 744 N.E.2d 877 (il. App. Ct. 2001), which upheld
the creation of a § 503(g) trust due to the fact that the father had been held in contempt of court
twice for his failure to pay and his arrearages were in excess of $50,000).
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comparing the language of the sections is an inappropriate and im-
proper application of whole-statute analysis.
In analyzing the language of § 510(c) in relation to § 510(d) (re-
garding child support termination) and § 503(g) (regarding child sup-
port security), the Ellinger court erred in two ways. First, the court
failed to recognize the distinct purposes of child support termination
events and spousal support termination events and thus incorrectly
concluded that the difference in the events with regards to the payor's
death implied that a trial court lacked authority to order post-death
maintenance.164 The court's comparison of the listed termination
events is therefore erroneous. Second, the court was wrong to pre-
sume that the legislature intended to limit the court's authority to or-
der security for a maintenance obligation by providing a subsection
that addressed judicial discretion to designate assets as security for
child support. 165 Particular provisions aimed at the protection of chil-
dren who are not parties of the divorce proceedings does not show by
the omission of similar provisions relating to maintenance that the leg-
islature intended to limit the trial court's authority to order post-death
maintenance because the purposes of the sections are distinct. 166 In
short, the financial protection of dependent ex-spouses in case of
death calls for different safeguards than the financial protection of de-
pendent children in case of disinheritance.
1. Comparing Exceptions to Statutory Termination Events
In order to effectively apply whole-statute interpretation, it is im-
portant to accurately identify what language is being interpreted. The
court in Ellinger was wrong to compare the statutory termination
events for child support with the statutory termination events for
maintenance to interpret the language "otherwise approved by the
court." 16 7 The issue in Ellinger, Walker, Clarke, and Vernon is the
language in § 510(c) dealing with the exceptions to the listed termina-
tion events-namely, whether a court is authorized to disregard the
listed termination events-not what the listed termination events
are.168 Although the listed events are distinguishable from the listed
164. See discussion infra notes 167-98 and accompanying text.
165. See discussion infra notes 199-220 and accompanying text.
166. In re Marriage of Dulyn, 411 N.E.2d 988, 994 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
167. 750 lu. Comp. STrAT. 5/5t0(d) (2008) (child support); 750 l.LL COMP. STAT. 5/510(c)
(2008) (maintenance).
168. In re Marriage of Ellinger, 882 N.E.2d 692, 695 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). "[T]he language in
the Act concerning a spouse's obligation to pay maintenance after the obligor's death is different
from the language in the Act concerning a parent's obligation to pay child support after the
obligor's death." Id.
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events for child support termination, the exceptions to the termination
events provided in the IMDMA for both child support and mainte-
nance provide a way for the court and the parties to contract around
the default termination provisions listed therein.169 Section 510(c)
states that the statutory termination events for maintenance apply un-
less "otherwise agreed by the parties in a written agreement set forth
in the judgment or otherwise approved by the court."170 Section
510(d) states that the statutory termination events for child support
apply unless "otherwise provided in this Act, or as agreed in writing or
expressly provided in the judgment."1'7 In sum, the exceptions are
analogous and properly comparable, but the termination events them-
selves are not.
Although the exact wording of these two phrases is not the same,
the Illinois Supreme Court has found that the functions of the phrases
are the same, having interpreted the language of both sections as au-
thorizing a court to order support beyond the listed the statutory ter-
mination events.172 In Finley v. Finley, the Illinois Supreme Court
interpreted the language "expressly provided in the judgment" as au-
thorizing a trial court to order child support to extend beyond emanci-
pation.173 In Freeman, the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted the
language "otherwise approved by the court" as authorizing trial courts
to extend maintenance beyond the termination events listed in
169. See In re Marriage of Mulry, 732 N.E.2d 667, 670 (il. App. Ct. 2000).
The general rule is that the obligation of a parent to support a child terminates when
the child reaches majority. In re Marriage of Holderrieth, 536 N.E.2d 946, 951 (III.
1989). However, § 510(d) . . . specifically provides that "[ulnless otherwise agreed in
writing or expressly provided in a judgment, provisions for the support of a child are
terminated by emancipation of the child, except as otherwise provided herein." The
legislative purpose behind the adoption of § 510(d) is to allow the parties to a dissolu-
tion proceeding to remain liable for the support of children beyond emancipation. Fin-
ley v. Finley, 410 N.E.2d 12, 16 (Ill. 1980) (discussing then § 510(c), which was later re-
designated section 510(d)).
Id. (second alteration in original). See also In re Marriage of Arvin, 540 N.E.2d 919, 923 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989). Parties may intend "their agreement concerning termination of maintenance to
supersede section 510(b) of the Act and the grounds for termination set forth therein." Id.
170. 750 li-i. Comp. STAT. 5/510(c).
171. 750 luL. COMP. STAT. 5/510(d).
172. See Finley v. Finley, 410 N.E.2d 12, 16 (Ill. 1980).
We agree with the appellate court opinion of In re Marriage of Raski, wherein the court
found that the provisions of the new act do not extend the parental obligation for sup-
port beyond minority except in limited statutory situation. . . . [W]e find that the legisla-
tive purpose behind section 510[c] is to permit the parties to agree to remain liable for
the support of the child beyond emancipation. The plain language of section 510[c]
states that provisions for child support are terminated by the child's emancipation, un-
less otherwise agreed in writing or by court order.
Id. (citation omitted).
173. Id.
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§ 510(c), namely remarriage.174 According to the corresponding deci-
sions of the court, both subsections authorize a trial court to order
alternative termination events or dates beyond the termination events
enumerated in the IMDMA.
The court in Ellinger went wrong by comparing the listed termina-
tion events for child support with the listed termination events for
maintenance. Again, the exceptions are analogous and properly com-
parable, but the events themselves are not. Unlike the exceptions to
the termination events listed in § 510(c) and § 510(d), which both au-
thorize a court to extend support beyond the listed termination
events, the actual statutory termination events for child support and
maintenance are very different. This led the court in Ellinger to con-
clude that the legislature did not intend for courts to order post-death
maintenance because they were expressly authorized to order post-
death child support. 75 The language in the IMDMA concerning a
spouse's obligation to pay maintenance after the obligor's death1 76 is
different from the language concerning a parent's obligation to pay
child support after the obligor's death.177 Section 510(c) states that
with certain exceptions "the obligation to pay future maintenance is
terminated upon the death of either party." 78 However, § 510(d)
says that with certain exceptions, provisions for the support of a child
are not terminated "by the death of a parent obligated to support or
educate the child."17 9 Since child support and maintenance are two
separate and distinct subjects of marital dissolution, it would be odd if
the legislature did not have different termination events for these
methods of support. Under the IMDMA, the statutory-termination
events for child support are (1) emancipation or (2) reaching age 18
or graduating from high school (whichever happens first). As dis-
cussed earlier,180 the statutory-termination events for spousal support
are (1) the death of the payor, (2) the remarriage of the payee, or (3)
the cohabitation of the payee. Not only are the statutory-termination
174. In re Marriage of Freeman, 478 N.E.2d 326, 330 (Ill. 1985).
175. In re Marriage of Ellinger, 882 N.E.2d 692, 695 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). The Ellinger court
seemed to be applying some form of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (the inclusion of one is
the exclusion of another) to the listed termination events. See id. at 694. "It is well established
that when the legislature used certain language in one part of an act, and different language in
another portion of the act, the legislature intended different results." Id. Again, although their
application of this maxim is correct, applying it to the listed termination events does not address
the issue of the whether or not a court order is an exception to those listed termination events.
176. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/510(c).
177. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/510(d); see also Ellinger, 882 N.E.2d at 695.
178. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/510(c).
179. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/510(d).
180. See supra notes 132-42 and accompanying text.
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events different, but § 510(d) specifically states that the death of the
payor is not a statutory-termination event for child support. 81 The
legislature made it clear that it never intended death to be a termina-
tion event for child support, even by court order, whereas for mainte-
nance death is explicitly listed as such in order to reap the tax benefits
of § 71 of the Internal Revenue Code.182
In Ellinger, the court concluded that, based on this difference in the
termination events, courts have discretion to order post-death child
support but not post-death maintenance.1 3 But the issue in Ellinger
and Walker was whether under § 510(c) a court was authorized to or-
der post-death maintenance-namely life insurance security-in the
face of death as a listed termination event.184 The issue was not
whether death was a listed statutory termination event for mainte-
nance. If the latter question was the issue, it would have been unnec-
essary for the court to look at § 510(d). The real issue is the court's
authority to disregard the statutory termination events and fashion an
alternative plan. The Ellinger court should have compared the lan-
guage of the exceptions, not the statutory termination events them-
selves, to answer this question.
Why did the legislature use the language "otherwise approved by
the court" to designate judicial discretion in one section and "ex-
pressly provided in the judgment" in another? Simply put, although
both phrases authorize the court to make awards beyond the statutory
termination periods, the court's authority to order post-death mainte-
nance serves a different purpose than the court's authority to provide
for post-majority child support in a judgment. In fact, the court's au-
thority to set post-majority child support termination dates is explic-
itly addressed in §§ 505(a), 505(g), 18 5 513(a)(1),186 and 513(a)(2).18 7
The purpose of authorizing a trial court to approve post-majority
child support is to promote the best interest of the child. Section
505(g) states, without exception, that termination of child support
"shall be no earlier than the date on which the child covered by the
181. 750 ILL. Comr. SrAr. 5/510(d).
182. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
183. In re Marriage of Ellinger, 882 N.E.2d 692, 695 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
184. Id. at 694.
185. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/505(g) (setting out the minimum termination dates for child
support).
186. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/513(a)(1) (allowing a court to order extended support for men-
tally or physically disabled children).
187. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/513(a)(2) (extending child support beyond emancipation when
the trial court order makes a provision for the contribution of secondary education expenses).
Under this subsection, the authority of the court to make provisions for educational expenses
terminates when the child receives a baccalaureate degree. Id.
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order will attain the age of 18" or "if the child will not graduate from
high school until after attaining the age of 18, then the termination
date shall be no earlier than . . . the child's high school graduation ...
or the date on which the child will attain the age of 19."s88 Although
this section prohibits authorizing child support that terminates before
maturity, nothing in § 505(g) prevents the court from extending sup-
port beyond maturity if it is in the best interest of the child. For exam-
ple, although parents are not usually held responsible for college
expenses, pursuant to § 513(a)(2) and according to the Illinois Su-
preme Court, the trial court, in its discretion, may require a divorced
parent to provide college expenses.'8 9 The statute explicitly autho-
rizes a trial court to create an obligation to pay educational expenses
post-majority to provide for the "best interest of the child."o90  In
fact, the allowance of post-majority support is one of the few luxuries
children of divorced parents may enjoy as opposed to children of still-
married parents.
In contrast to the purpose behind authorizing post-majority child
support, the purpose of authorizing a trial court to order post-death
maintenance is to ensure the just and equitable division of marital
property. The court's discretion to approve post-death maintenance
obligations arises from the court's responsibility to ensure a just divi-
sion of marital property based on the twelve factors'91 enumerated in
the IMDMA and any other factors the court finds "just and equita-
ble."192 In addition, the court's discretion to approve and incorporate
agreements and orders regarding maintenance awards arises from a
need to ensure that agreements between parties concerning mainte-
nance or orders by the court "could be put within a divorce decree
and be enforceable." 193 As referenced earlier, in 1981, the Illinois
Senate passed bill 267 adding the following language: "[U]nless other-
wise agreed by the parties in a written separation agreement set forth
in the judgment or otherwise approved by the court."194 The Chicago
Bar Association and the Illinois State Bar Association lobbied for the
passage of this amendment because the language ensured that mainte-
188. 750 Il.. COMP. STAT. 5/505(g).
189. In re Support of Pearson, 490 N.E.2d 1274, 1277 (Ill. 1986).
190. 750 IlL. COMP. STAT. 5/505(a)(2).
191. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/504(a)(1)-(12).
192. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/504(a)(12).
193. S.B. 267, 82nd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1981) (explanation in the third reading of
S.B. 267).
194. See Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, Pub. Act No. 82-194, § 510(b),
1981 Ill. Laws 1130 (inserting "Unless otherwise agreed by the parties in a written separation
agreement set forth in the judgment or otherwise approved by the court . . . .").
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nance awards made either by agreement of the parties or by court
order-which were subsequently incorporated in the judgment-re-
tained legal significance, allowing the payor a tax deduction equal to
alimony payments made within the taxable year.195 The legislature
intended to make it clear that under § 510(c) a payor was meant to
retain tax deductions for maintenance obligations, including those
made after statutory termination events arising out of an agreement of
the parties or a court order.196 In Mass, the court stated that one of
the primary reasons for clarifying the language was to allow for a hus-
band to get a federal tax deduction for maintenance payments made
beyond an ex-wife's remarriage when the continuation of mainte-
nance payments was required by the judgment. 97
Looking at the language of the exceptions rather than the language
of the termination events themselves, it is clear that the legislature
intended trial courts to maintain the authority to tailor both spousal
support and child support to the needs of the parties, by extending
support beyond the termination events provided in the IMDMA. For
children, the court's discretion to extend support post-majority may
ensure the best educational interest of the child. For a dependent ex-
spouse, extending maintenance post-death may involve using life in-
surance or a life insurance trust to ensure a maintenance award is
"just and equitable"I 98 and that parties to the agreement are able to
receive the necessary tax benefits.
2. Comparing § 503(g) Child Support Trusts
The legislature did not intend to limit the court's authority to au-
thorize post-death maintenance protection by including language al-
lowing courts to set aside marital assets for the benefit of dependent
children in special circumstances. Support trusts created by the court
for the benefit of dependent children are highly distinguishable from
post-death maintenance awards, such as life insurance, because
§ 503(g) trusts protect against default under special circumstances,
whereas post-death awards protect only against non-payment due to
death. Despite this fact, the court in Ellinger reasoned that the legis-
lature did not intend to authorize trial courts to award post-death
maintenance because the IMDMA contains specific language author-
izing a court to set aside marital or non-marital property in a "trust for
the support, maintenance, education, physical and mental health, and
195. See In re Marriage of Mass, 431 N.E.2d 1, 13 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
196. Id.; see also S.B. 267, 96th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1981).
197. Mass, 431 N.E.2d at 13.
198. 750 lu. COMP. Sr-r. 5/504(a)(12) (2008).
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general welfare of any minor, dependent, or incompetent child of the
parties."199 and does not contain a corresponding provision for main-
tenance obligations. 200 However, it would have been repetitive for the
legislature to create a provision in the IMDMA allowing a court to set
aside marital or non-marital property in a trust for the benefit of a
party receiving maintenance, because the purpose of § 503 is to divide
the marital property in just proportions considering all relevant fac-
tors, including the relative economic circumstances of the parties,201
whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to mainte-
nance, 202 and the education, age, health, and general needs of both
parties to the dissolution.203 For example, taking these factors into
account, "an aged unemployed spouse in ill health might receive a
greater percentage of the marital property than would a younger em-
ployable spouse." 204
Pursuant to § 503(d)(1)-(12), when determining property settle-
ments, a court must consider all relevant factors to allocate the marital
property in "just proportions." 2 0 5 If these factors lead the court to
determine that a party should receive a greater portion of the jointly
held assets, then the court will award a greater percentage to the de-
serving party.206 Consequently, the level of discretion authorized by
the "just portions" language of § 503(d) concerning property distribu-
tion already accounts for "the support, maintenance, education, physi-
cal and mental health, and general welfare" of a dependent spouse.207
For example, the court is required to take into consideration "the rele-
vant economic circumstances of each spouse when the division of
property is to become effective," including situations such as unem-
ployment, retirement, and the opportunity for future income. 208
Given various facts, a court may determine that periodic maintenance
199. 750 1lu1. COMP. STAT. 5/503(g).
200. See In re Marriage of Ellinger, 882 N.E.2d 692, 695 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
201. 750 lL. COMP. STAT. 5/503(d)(5).
202. 750 111. COMP. STAT. 5/503(d)(10).
203. 750 liu . CoMr. STAT. 5/503(d)(8). Under an analysis of the individual facts of a case, the
percentage allocation of marital property can range from 0% to 100%. See DAVIS & YAZICI,
supra note 11, at 130 (citing Stallings v. Stallings, 393 N.E.2d 1065 (111. App. Ct. 1979)). The
division must be equitable, but not necessarily equal. Id. (citing In re Marriage of Orlando, 577
N.E.2d 1334, 1340 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), which awarded two thirds of the marital property to the
wife when the husband had a higher education and better income potential).
204. See DAVIS & YAZICI, supra note 11, at 138 (citing In re Marriage of Swigers, 531 N.E.2d
858 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); In re Marriage of Bonneau, 691 N.E.2d 123 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)).
205. 750 luL. COMP. STAr. 5/503(d).
206. See Stallings, 393 N.E.2d at 1066-67 (upholding an award of 100% of the marital assets to
the wife).
207. 750 lu L. COMP. STAT. 5/503(g).
208. 750 I L. COMP. STAT. 5/503(d).
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payments are unworkable or unnecessary. Accordingly, in lieu of
maintenance, the court may award a greater percentage of the marital
property to the dependent spouse.209
In contrast to dependent spouses, children lack standing to negoti-
ate for a portion of the marital property to ensure their future finan-
cial security.210 However, § 503(g) provides for the creation of a
support trust for children by specifically authorizing courts to allocate
marital or non-marital property to the children if it is in their best
interest and the court finds that special circumstances require it.211
For example, a trust may be established if there is evidence showing
that a parent is unwilling or unable to make direct payments of sup-
port.212 In addition, where vast fluctuations in income have occurred
or are likely due to special circumstances, § 503(g) authorizes a trial
court to further the best interests of the children by protecting child
support payments with the use of a § 503(g) trust, thereby including
the children's interest in the property division.213 Therefore, pursuant
to § 503 in the case of both a dependent spouse and a dependent child,
Illinois courts have the discretion to use property to ensure just and
equitable financial support.
The first factor a court must consider in determining whether a
maintenance award is just, equitable, and workable is the property
distribution. 214 If the property award is sufficient to provide for a de-
pendent spouse or a maintenance award seems unworkable, a court
will increase the property apportionment to reflect this determina-
209. Beermann & London, supra note 53, at 659.
[T]he burden should be on the spouse seeking maintenance to show that she will have
insufficient income and property to provide for her reasonable needs. Second, the court
should view the division of property and the question of maintenance as interrelated
tools designed to achieve a common goal: severing the parties' financial ties with each
other by providing for post-dissolution security and support through a division of prop-
erty rather than through periodic maintenance.
Id.
210. See Garrison v. Garrison, 425 N.E.2d 518, 521 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
211. 750 luL. COMP. STAT. 5/503(g); see also In re Marriage of Andrew, 628 N.E.2d 221 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993). The creation of § 503(g) trusts out of the net proceeds of the sale of the marital
home is proper to promote the best interests of the child under special circumstances or when
both parties agree. Andrew, 628 N.E.2d at 224.
212. See Atkinson v. Atkinson, 429 N.E.2d 465 (Ill. 1981); see also In re Marriage of Pickholtz,
533 N.E.2d 529 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
213. Judith G. McMullen, Prodding the Payor and Policing the Payee: Using Child Support
Trusts to Create an Incentive for Prompt Payment of Support Obligations, 32 NEw ENG. L. REV.
439, 459 (1998); see also Andrew, 628 N.E.2d at 225.
214. 750 lu. CoMP. STAr. 5/504(a)(1).
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tion.215 Before the adoption of § 503(g), the court did not have discre-
tion to set aside marital property for dependent children. 216 Child
support was the only financial benefit a court could award children of
divorce. If support went unpaid, children had no property to fall back
on. However, § 503(g) allows courts to include children in the divi-
sion of property by creating trusts which can be borrowed against if
child support is not forthcoming or for certain educational ex-
penses.217 This type of default security is distinguishable from any
form of post-death maintenance award-such as a life insurance pol-
icy-because a dependent spouse cannot invoke post-death payment
upon default.218 Consequently, post-death maintenance awards are
highly distinguishable from the security provided by § 503(g) trusts.
In other words, a court may order the creation of a § 503(g) trust
based on evidence that child support may go unpaid; however, a court
will not order a party to maintain a life insurance policy to ensure that
maintenance payments are made in a timely manner because life in-
surance in no way secures periodic payments during the life of the
payor. The purpose of ordering post-death maintenance is to ensure
that if the payor dies while it was still his duty to pay support, his ex-
spouse could avail herself of the proceeds of a life insurance policy or
continuing support payments. 219 In contrast to § 503(g) trusts, post-
death protection for a maintenance obligation does not involve ex-
isting assets and it may not be borrowed against in case of default or
inability to pay under special circumstances. 220 Post-death mainte-
nance protections such as life insurance protect against the premature
death of the payor spouse, not the default. As the court in Walker
noted, the legislature did not intend to limit the court's authority re-
garding post-death maintenance protection by including language al-
lowing courts to set aside marital assets for the benefit of dependent
children in special circumstances.
215. Beermann & London, supra note 53, at 659. "It would make no sense to award a spouse
sufficient property to provide for her reasonable needs and then not require her to use the
property for its intended purpose." Id.
216. McMullen, supra note 213, at 454.
217. Andrew, 628 N.E.2d at 221.
218. Maginnis v. Maginnis, 153 N.E. 654, 657 (Ill. 1926).
219. Id.
220. See In re Marriage of Petersen, 744 N.E.2d 877, 891 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (upholding the
imposition of a § 503(g) trust due to the father's demonstrated unwillingness to remain current
on his child support obligation).
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IV. IMPACT
A. Future Financial Security for Dependant Parties
It helps to return to the hypothetical separation of Jack and Jill to
fully understand the impact that authorizing courts to order post-
death maintenance has on the individual parties to a divorce. If Jack
and Jill do not execute a complete marital settlement agreement, they
will go to trial. Hypothetically speaking, based on concerns about
Jack's health or on his recent interest in cliff diving, a judge may find it
necessary to provide Jill with financial security beyond Jack's death,
namely in the form of a life insurance policy. Prohibiting a court
from ordering post-death maintenance, particularly in the form of life
insurance, creates a gaping hole in the extensive maintenance provi-
sions of the IMDMA and undermines the Act's stated purpose of "mi-
tigat[ing] the potential harm to the spouses and their children caused
by the process of legal dissolution of marriage" 221 because moments
after Jill is awarded a substantial and permanent maintenance award
meant to provide for her for the rest of her life, Jack could get hit by a
bus and Jill would get nothing. In such a case, 222 a failure to provide
post-death protection would result in a future for Jill that is riddled
with financial insecurity as a result of her divorce because the court
previously determined that she made substantially less then Jack, she
was in charge of the domestic chores for thirty years, and she needed
monthly maintenance to survive. The language of § 510(c) authorizes
courts to provide post-death maintenance if justice and equity require
because the concepts of safeguarding families, mitigating harm, pro-
moting equity, and eliminating misconduct 223 are core purposes of the
IMDMA. The language of § 510(c) should not be construed in a way
that eliminates the court's ability to construct safeguards in divorce
judgments to promote these goals. Rather, a strict interpretation of
the plain meaning of § 510(c) and a whole-statute analysis show that
the Illinois legislature intended to authorize courts to provide post-
death maintenance if the specific facts so require.
B. Tax Consequences
Given the authority to extend the obligation to pay maintenance
beyond the death of the payor, however, courts must keep in mind the
intimate connection that maintenance has to taxable income. If a
judge chooses to extend the obligation to pay maintenance beyond the
221. 750 ILL. Comp. STATr. 5/102(a)(4) (2008).
222. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
223. 750 ILL. COMP. STAi. 5/102(1)-(8).
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death of the payor, this action would constitute a valid "drafting out"
of the plain language of the Act providing that maintenance termi-
nates at the "death of either party" and ensuring federal tax deduc-
tions. If it is the intention of the parties or the judge for maintenance
payments to be taxable to the payee and deductible by the payor, not-
withstanding the extension of the payor's obligation post-death, main-
tenance must still be tied to the death of the payee pursuant to I.R.C.
§ 71(d).
Subsection (D), the only part of the § 71 definition at issue with
post-death maintenance, requires that for payments to be deemed
maintenance, there must be no liability to continue payments after the
death of the payee spouse. Otherwise, the payments are neither taxa-
ble to the payee nor deductible by the payor. While under the Tax
Reform Act, a support agreement that does not explicitly provide that
payments terminate upon the death of the payee spouse can neverthe-
less satisfy § 71(b)(1)(D) if the payments terminate in the event of the
payee spouse's death by operation of state law, 224 under a provision
that explicitly nullifies the operation of state law, no such presumption
can apply and the taxable/deductible requirements are not met. The
following examples are illustrative.
Example 1: Jack is ordered by the court pursuant to the couple's
decree of divorce to pay Jill $2,000 each month, commencing on Janu-
ary 1, 2011, and payable for month to month thereafter, so long as Jill
lives. No event other than the death of Jill terminates the mainte-
nance payments. Tax Consequences:225 Assuming these payments
conform to the additional requirements of § 71, Jack's payments are
deductible from his gross income and taxable to Jill. This is an exam-
ple of the authority that a court possesses under § 510(c) to extend the
obligation to pay maintenance beyond death of the payor while main-
taining a deductible/taxable status under I.R.C. § 71.
Example 2: Jack is ordered by the court pursuant to the couple's
decree of divorce to pay Jill $2,000 each month, commencing on Janu-
ary 1, 2011, and payable for month to month thereafter, for 15 years.
Maintenance payments are set to terminate upon Jill's remarriage or
conjugal cohabitation but not upon the death of Jack. Tax Conse-
quences: Again, this is an example of effective extension of a mainte-
224. See I.R.S. Notice 87-9, 1987-1 C.B. 421; see also Johanson v. C.I.R., 541 F.3d 973, 977 (9th
Cir. 2008) (citing Kean v. Comm'r, 407 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 2005); Lovejoy v. Comm'r, 293 F.3d
1208, 1210 (10th Cir. 2002); Barrett v. United States, 74 F.3d 661, 664 (5th Cir. 1996); Hoover v.
Comm'r, 102 F.3d 842, 846-48 (6th Cir. 1996); Zinsmeister v. Comm'r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 774, 7
(2000)).
225. JOSEPH N. DUCANTO, TAx AsicTS OF DISSOLUTION AND SEPARATION (1982) was re-
lied on in part in developing these examples.
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nance obligation post-death; however, Jack's payments would not be
deductible from his gross income and taxable to Jill because the pay-
ments are not tied to Jill's death as required by § 71. Further, the
payments cannot terminate upon her death under § 510(c) because
the court explicitly drafted out of the § 510(c) "death of either party"
provision. Thus, by the express intention of the divorce decree, these
maintenance payments have been made nondeductible. While the
nondeductibility of the maintenance payments may be purposeful,
parties and courts must be aware of the specific tax consequences in
order to properly take them into account when evaluating the equity
of the overall property settlement and the dollar amount of the
monthly maintenance award.
A full discussion of the tax ramifications and complexities associ-
ated with the maintenance of court-ordered life insurance is beyond
the scope of this Comment. However, the deductible/taxable nature
of the insurance premiums typically turns on ownership of the pol-
icy. 226 Generally, where the payor owns the policy and pays the pre-
miums, the premiums are not deductible to him. In contrast, when the
payee spouse owns the policy but the payor pays the premiums for her
benefit, the payments may be deductible. 227 Temporary regulation
1.71-iT, A-6 expressly provides that "premiums paid by the payor
spouse for term or whole life insurance on the payor's life made under
the terms of the divorce or separation instrument will qualify as pay-
ments on behalf of the payee spouse to the extent that the payee
spouse is the owner of the policy." 228
V. CONCLUSION
The current split in the Illinois appellate courts is a result of a com-
bination of confusing statutory interpretations and conflicting social
policies. 229 However, interpreting statutes based on the social policy
of various districts or the reasoning of various judges is inconsistent
with the uniformity imagined by the Illinois legislature in enacting the
IMDMA. In interpreting the language of the IMDMA, a court must
look to the plain meaning of the language and then to the whole stat-
226. See DAVIS & YAZICI, supra note 11, at 1332.
227. Id.
228. 26 C.F.R. § 1.71-iT (1984).
229. In Walker, the court applied liberal construction and a need for broad discretionary pow-
ers in family court to justify authorization of court-ordered post-death maintenance. 899 N.E.2d
1097 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). This contrasted with Ellinger, which denied approval of post-death
maintenance because the language of § 510(c) is different from the language regarding child
support and the court found a need for strict statutory limits on judicial discretion in family
court. 882 N.E.2d 692, 695 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
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ute. Applying the basic principles of plain-meaning and whole-stat-
ute analysis to the language of § 510(c) proves to be the most
consistent and logically sound way to ascertain the true intent of the
Illinois legislature because it is consistent with the Illinois Supreme
Court's holding in Freeman and it comports with the generally ac-
cepted principles of statutory construction used to interpret other Illi-
nois support statutes.
By applying both plain-meaning interpretation and whole-statute
analysis to the language of § 510(c) as required by the Illinois Su-
preme Court, it is clear that the legislature intended to authorize trial
courts to award various forms of post-death maintenance. Conse-
quently, a trial court may protect the future financial needs of a de-
pendent spouse through the use of court-ordered life insurance or
various other forms of post-death support.
As long as the court order is just and equitable, the language of
§ 510(c) as interpreted by plain-meaning and whole-statute analysis
authorizes a court to provide post-death maintenance. Therefore, if a
court should have any worry that Jack may soon be hit by a bus, enter-
ing an order obligating Jack to maintain a life insurance policy for the
sole benefit of Jill does not violate § 510(c) because the legislature
intended a court to maintain this authority.
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